Coordination and cooperation in asymmetric commons dilemmas: A replication study

9 Pages Posted: 24 Sep 2021

See all articles by Johannes Jarke-Neuert

Johannes Jarke-Neuert

University of Hamburg - Center for Earth System Research and Sustainability (CEN)

Date Written: September 21, 2021

Abstract

Janssen et al. (2011, Experimental Economics, Vol. 14, pp. 547–566) studied an asymmetric, finitely repeated common-pool resource dilemma with free-form communication in which subjects made decisions about investments in an infrastructure, and about extraction from a resource made available by this infrastructure. They found that infrastructure provision and joint payoffs converged to high levels because structurally advantaged “front-enders” tend to behave fairly by restricting themselves voluntarily at the extraction stage, and structurally disadvantaged “tail-enders” reciprocate by investing. This paper reports a fully independent, pre-registered, double-blind replication attempt conducted in a different lab, that also supplies elevated statistical power and adheres to the highest principles of scientific transparency and openness. It is found that the key results of Janssen et al. not only re-appear qualitatively but are quantitatively and statistically strengthened. The conclusions drawn from the results are therefore robust, and the basic design can be confidently used for follow-up research.

Keywords: common-pool resources, asymmetry, irrigation, fairness, real-time experiment

JEL Classification: C91, C92, Q25, Q57

Suggested Citation

Jarke-Neuert, Johannes, Coordination and cooperation in asymmetric commons dilemmas: A replication study (September 21, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3928469 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3928469

Johannes Jarke-Neuert (Contact Author)

University of Hamburg - Center for Earth System Research and Sustainability (CEN) ( email )

Bundesstrasse 53
Hamburg, Hamburg 20146
Germany

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