Organizational Capacity and Profit Shifting

64 Pages Posted: 22 Sep 2021

See all articles by Katarzyna Anna Bilicka

Katarzyna Anna Bilicka

Utah State University; University of Oxford - Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation

Daniela Scur

Cornell University - Charles H. Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management; Cornell SC Johnson College of Business

Date Written: September 2021

Abstract

This paper analyses the effect of a firm's organizational capacity on the reported profitability of multinational enterprises (MNEs). Better organizational practices improve productivity and the potential taxable profits of firms. However, higher adoption of these practices may also enable more efficient allocation of profits across tax jurisdictions, lowering actual taxable profits. We present new evidence that MNE subsidiaries with better such practices, when located in high-tax countries, report significantly lower profits and have a higher incidence of bunching around zero returns on assets. We show these results are driven by patterns consistent with profit-shifting behavior. Further, using an event study design, we find that firms with better practices are more responsive to corporate tax rate changes. Our results suggest organizational capacity, especially monitoring-related practices, enables firms to engage in shifting profits away from their high-tax subsidiaries.

Keywords: monitoring practices, organizational capacity, Profit shifting

JEL Classification: H26, H32, M11, M2

Suggested Citation

Bilicka, Katarzyna Anna and Scur, Daniela, Organizational Capacity and Profit Shifting (September 2021). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP16502, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3928799

Katarzyna Anna Bilicka (Contact Author)

Utah State University ( email )

Logan, UT 84322
United States

University of Oxford - Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation ( email )

Saïd Business School
Park End Street
Oxford, OX1 1HP
United Kingdom

Daniela Scur

Cornell University - Charles H. Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management ( email )

Ithaca, NY
United States

Cornell SC Johnson College of Business ( email )

Ithaca, NY 14850
United States

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