Diverse Policy Committees Can Reach Underrepresented Groups

87 Pages Posted: 22 Sep 2021

See all articles by Francesco D'Acunto

Francesco D'Acunto

Georgetown University

Andreas Fuster

École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne; Swiss Finance Institute; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Michael Weber

University of Chicago - Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 2021

Abstract

Increasing the diversity of policy committees has taken center stage worldwide, but whether and why diverse committees are more effective is still unclear. In a randomized control trial that varies the salience of female and minority representation on the Federal Reserve's monetary policy committee, the FOMC, we test whether diversity affects how Fed information influences consumers' subjective beliefs. Women and Black respondents form unemployment expectations more in line with FOMC forecasts and trust the Fed more after this intervention. Women are also more likely to acquire Fed-related information when associated with a female official. White men, who are overrepresented on the FOMC, do not react negatively. Heterogeneous taste for diversity can explain these patterns better than homophily. Our results suggest more diverse policy committees are better able to reach underrepresented groups without inducing negative reactions by others, thereby enhancing the effectiveness of policy communication and public trust in the institution.

Suggested Citation

D'Acunto, Francesco and Fuster, Andreas and Weber, Michael, Diverse Policy Committees Can Reach Underrepresented Groups (September 2021). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP16563, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3928877

Francesco D'Acunto (Contact Author)

Georgetown University ( email )

Washington, DC 20057
United States

Andreas Fuster

École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne ( email )

Quartier UNIL-Chamberonne
Bâtiment Extranef
CH-1015 Lausanne
Switzerland

Swiss Finance Institute ( email )

c/o University of Geneva
40, Bd du Pont-d'Arve
CH-1211 Geneva 4
Switzerland

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Michael Weber

University of Chicago - Finance ( email )

5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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