Venture Capitalist Directors and Managerial Incentives
86 Pages Posted: 28 Sep 2021 Last revised: 17 Sep 2022
Date Written: September 13, 2022
Abstract
We examine the effect of board members with venture capital experience (VC directors) on executive incentives at non-venture-backed public firms. VC directors serving on the compensation committee are associated with greater CEO risk-taking incentives (vega) and pay-for-performance sensitivity (delta). These effects are more substantial if VC directors are from highly reputable VC firms. Using availability of direct flights to VC hub cities and annual estimates of VC dry powder per industry as instruments, we show that these results are causal. In addition, VC directors are more focused on growth performance goals in CEO compensation contracts. We also document that prior finding of greater research intensity and innovation when VC directors serve on boards of public firms is partly explained by increased risk-taking incentives of the CEO instilled by such directors. Lastly, we find that having VC directors on nominating and/or governance committees is associated with a higher likelihood of forced CEO turnover.
Keywords: Venture Capital, Executive Compensation, Board of Directors, Performance Goals, Compensation Goals
JEL Classification: G24, G34, J33
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation