Structural Empirical Analysis of Contracting in Vertical Markets

67 Pages Posted: 27 Sep 2021 Last revised: 7 Oct 2021

See all articles by Robin S. Lee

Robin S. Lee

Harvard University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Michael D. Whinston

Sloan School of Management and Department of Economics

Ali Yurukoglu

Stanford University

Date Written: September 2021

Abstract

This chapter presents an overview of advances in the structural analysis of contracting in vertical markets over the past fifteen years. We provide a discussion of theoretical models of contracting and bargaining that form the basis of recent empirical work, and then present common approaches used by researchers to take these models to the data. We also briefly survey the structural empirical literature on topics in vertical markets (including horizontal and vertical mergers, price discrimination, and nonlinear and exclusionary contracts), and conclude with a discussion of potential topics for future research.

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Suggested Citation

Lee, Robin S. and Whinston, Michael D. and Yurukoglu, Ali, Structural Empirical Analysis of Contracting in Vertical Markets (September 2021). NBER Working Paper No. w29282, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3931804

Robin S. Lee (Contact Author)

Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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Michael D. Whinston

Sloan School of Management and Department of Economics ( email )

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E62-416
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States

Ali Yurukoglu

Stanford University

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