Can the Federal Trade Commission Use Rulemaking to Change Antitrust Law?

24 Pages Posted: 4 Nov 2021

See all articles by Richard J. Pierce

Richard J. Pierce

George Washington University Law School

Date Written: September 30, 2021

Abstract

Lina Khan, the new Chair of the FTC, proposes to use notice and comment rulemaking to make major changes in antitrust law by declaring many practices to be “unfair methods of competition” within the meaning of that term in section five of the FTC Act. She has the strong backing of President Biden and her Democrat colleagues. That raises two questions. Does the FTC have the power to use the notice and comment process to implement Section five? If it has that power, can it use the rulemaking process to make the major changes in antitrust law that Chair Khan proposes? Professor Pierce answers those questions in this article.

He concludes that the FTC probably lacks the power to use notice and comment rulemaking to implement section five of the FTC Act. He also concludes that, even if the FTC has that power, it cannot use that power to make most of the major changes in antitrust law that Chair Khan envisions. The FTC can use rulemaking to improve antitrust law by limiting the use of non-compete clauses in employment contracts, but the FTC can accomplish that goal more rapidly and with less legal risk by using a combination of the tools that it has long used—interpretive rules, policy statements, and adjudication.

Keywords: administrative law, antitrust law

Suggested Citation

Pierce, Richard J., Can the Federal Trade Commission Use Rulemaking to Change Antitrust Law? (September 30, 2021). GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2021-42, GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 2021-42, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3933921

Richard J. Pierce (Contact Author)

George Washington University Law School ( email )

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