Objective Intentionalism and Disagreement
(2021) 27(4) Legal Theory 316
53 Pages Posted: 1 Oct 2021 Last revised: 11 Oct 2023
Date Written: September 30, 2021
Abstract
Intentionalist theories of legal interpretation are often divided between objectivist and subjectivist variants. The former take an interpretation to be correct depending on what the reasonable/rational lawmaker intended or what the reasonable/rational audience thinks they intended. The latter take an interpretation to be correct where the interpretation is what the speaker actually intended. This paper argues that objectivism faces serious problems as it cannot deal with disagreement: Reasonable and rational people can often disagree as to what the interpretation of a text should be. It also defends subjectivism against criticisms by objectivists.
Keywords: Intentionalism, Legal Interpretation, Purposivism, Objective Intent, Subjective Intent, Legal Epistemology
JEL Classification: K00, K10
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation