Delaware's Fiduciary Imagination: Going-Privates and Lord Eldon's Reprise

55 Pages Posted: 10 Dec 2021

See all articles by David Kershaw

David Kershaw

London School of Economics - Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: October 5, 2021

Abstract

What does it mean to be a fiduciary, and does it really matter whether the law labels a person a fiduciary or not? Until the late twentieth century Delaware corporate law could have given a singular, coherent answer to these questions; an answer that bore the deep imprint of fiduciary obligation fashioned in England in the early 19th century. Today, to its detriment, it is no longer able to provide clear answers to these questions. Through a close reading of Delaware’s early corporate fiduciary law and its contemporary going private case law, this article shows how late 20th century Delaware corporate law comingled, and then replaced, the traditional conception of what it means to be a fiduciary—which orbited the transfer and exercise of power (the power/undertaking conception)—with a conception which is power-blind and focused only on the influence and superiority that one person has over a more vulnerable other (the influence conception). The article tracks the accidental and unnoticed evolution of this conceptual shift and shows how it has altered the structure and source of Delaware fiduciary obligation, how it has significantly expanded the potential extent of fiduciary obligation, and how it has expanded the potential beneficiaries of such obligation. Delaware’s modern tool kit—including “the Duty of Loyalty”—as well as several modern fiduciary questions, uncertainties and anomalies are, the article argues, the product of this surreptitious 20th century appropriation of the conception of the “fiduciary”; without it, they would not exist.

Suggested Citation

Kershaw, David, Delaware's Fiduciary Imagination: Going-Privates and Lord Eldon's Reprise (October 5, 2021). Washington University Law Review, Vol. 98, No. 6, 2021, 1670, LSE Legal Studies Working Paper No. 20/2021, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3936552

David Kershaw (Contact Author)

London School of Economics - Law School

Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
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1000 Brussels
Belgium

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