Preferences for Giving Versus Preferences for Redistribution

52 Pages Posted: 11 Oct 2021

See all articles by Johanna Mollerstrom

Johanna Mollerstrom

George Mason University

Avner Strulov-Shlain

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business

Dmitry Taubinsky

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 7, 2021

Abstract

We report the results of an online experiment studying preferences for giving and preferences for group-wide redistribution in small (4-person) and large (200-person) groups. We find that the desire to engage in voluntary giving decreases significantly with group size. However, voting for group-wide redistribution is precisely estimated to not depend on group size. Moreover, people’s perception of the size of their reference group is malleable, and affects their desire to give. These results suggest that government programs, such as progressive tax-and-transfer systems, can help satisfy other-regarding preferences for redistribution in a way that creating opportunities for voluntary giving cannot.

Keywords: social preferences, giving, redistribution, public goods

JEL Classification: C91, D63, D81, H23

Suggested Citation

Mollerstrom, Johanna and Strulov-Shlain, Avner and Taubinsky, Dmitry, Preferences for Giving Versus Preferences for Redistribution (October 7, 2021). University of Chicago, Becker Friedman Institute for Economics Working Paper No. 2021-117, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3938343 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3938343

Johanna Mollerstrom

George Mason University ( email )

4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States

Avner Strulov-Shlain (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

5807 S Woodlawn Ave
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

Dmitry Taubinsky

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics ( email )

579 Evans Hall
Berkeley, CA 94709
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
76
Abstract Views
289
rank
404,014
PlumX Metrics