Platform Competition Under the Ambiguous Two-Sided Market Theory

20 Pages Posted: 18 Nov 2021

See all articles by Gregor Rauch

Gregor Rauch

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: September 10, 2021

Abstract

The concept of two-sided markets tries to describe certain characteristics of today's big platforms. Despite attracting a great deal of academic interest, closer inspection shows that the theory suffers from a great deal of ambiguity. This paper attempts to highlight these fundamental ambiguities surrounding the two-sided market theory and - by examining contemporary antitrust lawsuits - illustrate how the two-sided market theory fails to ensure platform competition.

Keywords: two-sided markets, antitrust, Epic Games v. Apple, Amex, Filistrucchi, competition, anti-steering, anti-steering rules, Google, Uber, Amazon, Facebook, Ohio v. American Express, Eu Commission, net harm, exchange of information

Suggested Citation

Rauch, Gregor, Platform Competition Under the Ambiguous Two-Sided Market Theory (September 10, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3938915 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3938915

Gregor Rauch (Contact Author)

affiliation not provided to SSRN

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