Employees, Pensions, and the New Economic Order

Columbia Univ. Center for Law and Economic Studies Working Paper No. 124

53 Pages Posted: 25 Jun 1997

See all articles by Jeffrey N. Gordon

Jeffrey N. Gordon

Columbia Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 1997


The "New Economic Order" in the United States is a regime of trade liberalization, a robust market in corporate control, and labor market flexibility. Among the consequences over the 1980-1995 period is a divergence between the growth rate of corporate profits and stocks prices, which have increased by approximately 250% in real terms, and wages, which have barely increased at all, except for the top quintile. Contrary to popular belief, employees have not significantly participated through their pension funds in this stock market appreciation. In the historically dominant defined benefit pension plan, the sponsoring firm, not the employee, is the residual claimant. Although employees are residual claimants of defined contribution plans, these funds have been underinvested in equity. In part this is because employees fear the volatility of equity returns. The article proposes a new capital market instrument, a "pension equity collar," that would take advantage of the longterm nature of pension fund investing to provide a guarantee of a minimum return close to the longterm average equity return in exchange for giving up (or sharing) the upside above the longterm average. Such an instrument could encourage greater employee equity investment and thus widen the distribution of the benefits of the New Economic Order. The article proposes that the U.S. Department of Labor initiate a rulingmaking project under Section 404(c) of ERISA to determine if such an instrument should be among the menu of choices provided to employees in defined contribution plans.

JEL Classification: J26, J31

Suggested Citation

Gordon, Jeffrey N., Employees, Pensions, and the New Economic Order (March 1997). Columbia Univ. Center for Law and Economic Studies Working Paper No. 124. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=39400 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.39400

Jeffrey N. Gordon (Contact Author)

Columbia Law School ( email )

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212-854-2316 (Phone)
212-854-7946 (Fax)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

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HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

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