What drives inspectors to counteract harmful but legal business conduct? A predictive model based on quantitative data from a broad range of Dutch inspectorates

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See all articles by Aute Kasdorp

Aute Kasdorp

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Rotterdam School of Management (RSM)

Wilte Zijlstra

Autoriteit Financiële Markten

Date Written: August 7, 2020

Abstract

Inspectors regularly face risks that are unregulated but that may nevertheless require public intervention. Such risks may proliferate due to innovation and social changes. In this study we provide the first quantitative insight into inspectors’ responses to harmful but legal business conduct. Our factor analysis combines survey data (N=263) with theory on street-level bureaucrats and harmful but legal conduct. The resulting model expands these theory fields. It predicts that inspectors undertake significantly more ‘Interventions Beyond the Law’ if they observe more harmful but legal business conduct, are more aware of their inspectorates’ relevant policies, display an activist enforcement stance towards harmful but legal conduct, and have an outcome-driven viewpoint towards such conduct.

Suggested Citation

Kasdorp, Aute and Zijlstra, Wilte, What drives inspectors to counteract harmful but legal business conduct? A predictive model based on quantitative data from a broad range of Dutch inspectorates (August 7, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=

Aute Kasdorp (Contact Author)

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Rotterdam School of Management (RSM) ( email )

Keizersgracht 42B
Amsterdam, 1015CR
Netherlands

Wilte Zijlstra

Autoriteit Financiële Markten ( email )

Vijzelgracht 50
Amsterdam, NE 1017 HS

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