Non-Bossiness and First-Price Auctions

9 Pages Posted: 14 Oct 2021

See all articles by Marek Pycia

Marek Pycia

University of Zurich

Madhav Raghavan

Department of Economics, University of Lausanne

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 30, 2021

Abstract

We show that the first-price auction with no reserve price is the essentially unique mechanism
that is non-bossy, individually rational, and efficient in equilibrium. The first-price auction with
optimal reserve price is the essentially unique mechanism that is non-bossy, individually rational,
and revenue maximizing.

Keywords: Auctions, non-bossiness, efficiency, individual rationality, revenue maximization

JEL Classification: C72, D44

Suggested Citation

Pycia, Marek and Raghavan, Madhav, Non-Bossiness and First-Price Auctions (June 30, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3941784 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3941784

Marek Pycia

University of Zurich ( email )

Rämistrasse 71
Zürich, CH-8006
Switzerland

Madhav Raghavan (Contact Author)

Department of Economics, University of Lausanne ( email )

Quartier UNIL-Chamberonne
Lausanne, Vaud CH-1015
Switzerland

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