Equilibrium Selection in Bargaining Models

60 Pages Posted: 19 Jun 2003

See all articles by Kenneth Binmore

Kenneth Binmore

University College London - Department of Economics

Larry Samuelson

Yale University - Department of Economics; Yale University - Cowles Foundation

H. Peyton Young

Brookings Institution

Date Written: March 21, 2003

Abstract

This paper examines evolutionary equilibrium selection in bargaining models. We show that random best-response and continuous best-response learning dynamics give rise to (different) simple sufficient conditions for identifying outcomes as stochastically stable. This allows us to characterize the implications of these dynamics in simple bargaining games.

Keywords: Nash demand game, contact game, evolutionary dynamics, equilibrium selection, risk dominance, best response, stochastic stability

Suggested Citation

Binmore, Kenneth and Samuelson, Larry and Young, H. Peyton, Equilibrium Selection in Bargaining Models (March 21, 2003). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=394262 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.394262

Kenneth Binmore (Contact Author)

University College London - Department of Economics ( email )

Gower Street
London WC1E 6BT, WC1E 6BT
United Kingdom
+44 20 7380 7804 (Phone)

Larry Samuelson

Yale University - Department of Economics ( email )

28 Hillhouse Ave
New Haven, CT 06520-8268
United States

Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Box 208281
New Haven, CT 06520-8281
United States

H. Peyton Young

Brookings Institution ( email )

1775 Massachusetts Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20036-2188
United States

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
181
Abstract Views
1,086
rank
166,487
PlumX Metrics