Disclosure Deregulation of Quarterly Reporting

42 Pages Posted: 18 Oct 2021

See all articles by Vanessa Behrmann

Vanessa Behrmann

University of Bremen - Chair of Accounting and Control; University of Bremen - Faculty of Business Studies and Economics

Lars Hornuf

University of Bremen - Faculty of Business Studies and Economics; Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Jochen Zimmermann

University of Bremen - Chair of Accounting and Control; University of Bremen - Faculty of Business Studies and Economics

Date Written: 2021

Abstract

In this article, we investigate the deregulation efforts resulting from the 2015 transposition of the EU’s Transparency Directive into German law and analyze whether a reduction in the minimum content requirements for quarterly reporting increases information asymmetries and decreases firm value. Using a novel dataset of firms that are listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, our results reveal that over the period from 2012 to 2019, lower quarterly reporting levels on average have increased information asymmetry and reduced firm value. We find that this effect is stronger for second-tier stocks and firms with low media coverage. Our results are robust to potential selection effects regarding firms’ choice of quarterly reporting content levels.

Keywords: quarterly reporting, disclosure deregulation, financial reporting, interim management statement, transparency directive

JEL Classification: G140, G320

Suggested Citation

Behrmann, Vanessa and Hornuf, Lars and Zimmermann, Jochen and Zimmermann, Jochen, Disclosure Deregulation of Quarterly Reporting (2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3943027 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3943027

Vanessa Behrmann (Contact Author)

University of Bremen - Chair of Accounting and Control; University of Bremen - Faculty of Business Studies and Economics ( email )

Max-von-Laue Straße 1
Bremen, DE 28359
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.uni-bremen.de/controlling/personen/team/vanessa-behrmann-msc

Lars Hornuf

University of Bremen - Faculty of Business Studies and Economics ( email )

Bremen, D-28359
Germany
+49 89 20348619 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.hornuf.com

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, Bayern 80539
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Jochen Zimmermann

University of Bremen - Faculty of Business Studies and Economics ( email )

Hochschulring 4
Germany
+49 421 218 9121 (Phone)

University of Bremen - Chair of Accounting and Control ( email )

Universitaetsallee GW I
Bremen, D-28334
Germany
+49 421 218-9119 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.controlling.uni-bremen.de

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