The Empty Court: A Quantitative Analysis of Vacancies in the Supreme Court of India

Author Manuscript. Final version published in 35 Delhi Law Review 55-73 (2020).

19 Pages Posted: 28 Nov 2021

See all articles by Rahul Hemrajani

Rahul Hemrajani

National Law School of India University, Bangalore

Date Written: May 10, 2019

Abstract

Judges in the Supreme Court of India are appointed through a unique self-appointment mechanism known as the “collegium system”. The collegium system has inter alia been criticised for being non-transparent and for enabling a non-accountable judiciary. This paper, using appointment and retirement data of the Supreme Court from 1950 till 2020 shows that there have been, on average, more vacancies in the SCI since 2015 than any other comparable period in recent history. It also shows, using published minutes of collegium meetings and department of justice appointment orders, that the appointment process is partly to blame for the delay in filling judicial vacancies. Based on this, this paper focuses on a different critique of the collegium system— that it leads to a delay in judicial appointments which in the light of the increasing pendency docket, results in a reduction in access to speedy justice.

Keywords: Supreme Court of India, Collegium, Judicial Appointments, Courts, Vacancies, Pendency

Suggested Citation

Hemrajani, Rahul, The Empty Court: A Quantitative Analysis of Vacancies in the Supreme Court of India (May 10, 2019). Author Manuscript. Final version published in 35 Delhi Law Review 55-73 (2020)., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3944296 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3944296

Rahul Hemrajani (Contact Author)

National Law School of India University, Bangalore ( email )

Bengaluru

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