Algorithms in the Marketplace: An Empirical Analysis of Automated Pricing in E-Commerce

73 Pages Posted: 8 Nov 2021 Last revised: 25 Mar 2024

See all articles by Philip Hanspach

Philip Hanspach

Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) - Economics Department (ECO); Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) - Policy Studies Branch

Geza Sapi

European Commission, DG Competition, Chief Economist's Team; Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf - Duesseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)

Marcel Wieting

Charles River Associates (CRA); KU Leuven, Department of Management, Strategy and Innovation (MSI)

Date Written: March 11, 2024

Abstract

We analyze algorithmic pricing on the largest online marketplace in the Netherlands and Belgium. Based on two months of pricing data for around 2800 products, we find no significant correlation between the use of algorithms and an increase in prices of the Buy Box (the most prominently displayed offer for a product). We document that the presence of an algorithmic seller in monopoly markets goes hand-in-hand with lower prices. This effect is likely due to algorithms correcting excessively high human-set prices. We describe several characteristic algorithmic pricing patterns. While some of these pricing patterns are consistent with algorithmic collusion, such practice appears to be a fringe phenomenon. Overall, our findings call for careful policy with respect to pricing algorithms that remains alert to the possibility of algorithmic collusion but recognizes that pricing algorithms may benefit consumers.

Keywords: JEL-Classification: D42, D82, L42 Algorithmic pricing, Artificial intelligence, Collusion

JEL Classification: D42, D82, L42

Suggested Citation

Hanspach, Philip and Sapi, Geza and Wieting, Marcel, Algorithms in the Marketplace: An Empirical Analysis of Automated Pricing in E-Commerce (March 11, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3945137 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3945137

Philip Hanspach

Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) - Economics Department (ECO) ( email )

2 rue Andre Pascal
Paris Cedex 16, MO 63108
France

Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) - Policy Studies Branch ( email )

Paris
France

Geza Sapi

European Commission, DG Competition, Chief Economist's Team ( email )

Place Madou, Madouplein 1
Saint-Josse-ten-Noode/Sint-Joost-ten-Noode
Brussels, B-1049
Belgium

Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf - Duesseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) ( email )

Universitaetsstr. 1
Duesseldorf, NRW 40225
Germany

Marcel Wieting (Contact Author)

Charles River Associates (CRA) ( email )

1201 F. St. NW
Ste. 700
Washington, DC 20004
United States

KU Leuven, Department of Management, Strategy and Innovation (MSI) ( email )

Naamsestraat 69
Leuven, B-3000
Belgium

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
1,118
Abstract Views
2,805
Rank
42,825
PlumX Metrics