Multi-Store Competition

Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 03-033/1

20 Pages Posted: 17 Jul 2003

See all articles by Maarten Janssen

Maarten Janssen

University of Vienna - Faculty of Business, Economics, and Statistics

Vladimir A. Karamychev

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE)

Peran van Reeven

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE); Tinbergen Institute; Tinbergen Institute

Date Written: March 2003

Abstract

This paper develops a model for multi-store competition between firms. Using the fact that different firms have different outlets and produce horizontally differentiated goods, we obtain a pure strategy equilibrium where firms choose a different location for each outlet and firms' locations are interlaced. Moreover, generically, the subgame perfect equilibrium is unique and when the firms have an equal number of outlets, prices are independent of the number of outlets.

Keywords: multi-store competition; hotelling; interlacing

JEL Classification: I18, D10, Z13

Suggested Citation

Janssen, Maarten C. W. and Karamychev, Vladimir A. and van Reeven, Peran, Multi-Store Competition (March 2003). Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 03-033/1, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=394582 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.394582

Maarten C. W. Janssen (Contact Author)

University of Vienna - Faculty of Business, Economics, and Statistics ( email )

Vienna, A-1210
Austria

Vladimir A. Karamychev

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam, NL 3062 PA
Netherlands

Peran Van Reeven

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam, NL 3062 PA
Netherlands

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands

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