Achieving Accountable State Security Forces in Transitioning States: Building Democratic State Security Forces in the Former Socialist Space

80 Pages Posted: 25 Oct 2021 Last revised: 3 Mar 2022

See all articles by Suzanne Freeman

Suzanne Freeman

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Political Science

Date Written: October 21, 2021

Abstract

How can security forces like intelligence agencies and police once focused on population suppression become accountable organizations that defend the state and public order? The role of non-military security forces, like intelligence agencies, is understudied within civil-military relations — how they relate to civilian policymakers, their military counterparts, and the society they protect. This paper will begin to address the relationship between state security forces and the democratizing state. State security forces (SSF) are armed groups controlled by the state beyond the regular military. This paper argues that in democratizing states, civil society contestation and pressure from international organizations push states to build accountable state security forces, defined as forces that have no executive abuse, legislative oversight, and legally circumscribe activities, but that this reform process can be disrupted by war or a legacy of a state security force role in governance.

Keywords: accountable, state, security, transition, democracy

Suggested Citation

Freeman, Suzanne, Achieving Accountable State Security Forces in Transitioning States: Building Democratic State Security Forces in the Former Socialist Space (October 21, 2021). MIT Political Science Department Research Paper No. 2021-4, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3947288 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3947288

Suzanne Freeman (Contact Author)

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Political Science ( email )

30 Wadsworth Street (Rm 470)
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States

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