Election Cycles in European Public Procurement

37 Pages Posted: 27 Oct 2021

See all articles by Annika Havlik

Annika Havlik

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research; University of Mannheim

Friedrich Heinemann

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research; University of Heidelberg - Alfred Weber Institute for Economics

Justus Nover

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Date Written: 2021

Abstract

This paper studies the existence of election cycles in public procurement in the European Union for the national level. We analyze different steps along the procurement process, namely the publication of the contract notice, the awarding of the contract, and the project completion. We point out how these steps should differ in their potential to address specific types of voters. We argue that the award provides politicians with a particularly appealing opportunity. It allows them to please the award-winning firms’ stakeholders and the spending decision becomes binding and credible also from the perspective of forward-looking voters. We find robust evidence for electioneering in contract notices and awards prior to national parliamentary elections. The effect in contract awards is particularly strong for certain sub-categories like education and is more pronounced for visible projects.

Keywords: Forward-looking voters, political budget cycles, retrospective voting, Tenders Electronic Daily (TED)

JEL Classification: D72, D73, H57

Suggested Citation

Havlik, Annika and Heinemann, Friedrich and Nover, Justus, Election Cycles in European Public Procurement (2021). ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 21-079, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3949863 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3949863

Annika Havlik (Contact Author)

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1
D-68034 Mannheim, 68034
Germany

University of Mannheim ( email )

Mannheim, 68131
Germany

Friedrich Heinemann

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1
D-68034 Mannheim, 68034
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.zew.de

University of Heidelberg - Alfred Weber Institute for Economics ( email )

Grabengasse 14
Heidelberg, D-69117
Germany

Justus Nover

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1
D-68034 Mannheim, 68034
Germany

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