Reciprocal Reactions to (In)Transparent Task Assignments: An Experimental Investigation

40 Pages Posted: 27 Oct 2021 Last revised: 29 Nov 2021

See all articles by Gerlinde Fellner-Röhling

Gerlinde Fellner-Röhling

Ulm University - Department of Mathematics and Economics

Kristijan Hromek

Independent

Janina Kleinknecht

affiliation not provided to SSRN; Ulm University - Department of Mathematics and Economics

Sandra Ludwig

Ulm University

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Abstract

We investigate how the transparency of selecting an agent affects the agent’s reciprocal behavior. In a modified gift-exchange game, agents either receive information about having (not) been selected or receive no such information at all, which allows to analyze reciprocity of agents who were not the preferred choice of the principal. While we find no overall effect of transparency, we find opposing gender-specific reactions: men’s behavior is in line with intention-based reciprocity, whereas women’s behavior is not. Our observations can be explained by gender-specific attribution styles of successes and failures (i.e., of having been selected or not).öööö

Keywords: intention-based reciprocity, employee selection, attribution styles, gender differences, guilt proneness

Suggested Citation

Fellner-Röhling, Gerlinde and Hromek, Kristijan and Kleinknecht, Janina and Kleinknecht, Janina and Ludwig, Sandra, Reciprocal Reactions to (In)Transparent Task Assignments: An Experimental Investigation. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3951005

Gerlinde Fellner-Röhling

Ulm University - Department of Mathematics and Economics ( email )

Helmholzstrasse
Ulm, D-89081
Germany

Kristijan Hromek

Independent ( email )

Janina Kleinknecht (Contact Author)

affiliation not provided to SSRN

No Address Available

Ulm University - Department of Mathematics and Economics ( email )

Helmholtzstrasse 18
Ulm, D-89081
Germany

Sandra Ludwig

Ulm University ( email )

Ulm University
Helmholtzstrasse 18
Ulm, Baden-Württemberg 89081
Germany

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