A Scalable Architecture for Electronic Payments

Lecture Notes in Computer Science 13412, doi:10.1007/978-3-031-32415-4_38

24 Pages Posted: 2 Nov 2021 Last revised: 1 Aug 2023

See all articles by Geoffrey Goodell

Geoffrey Goodell

University College London

D. R. Toliver

TODAQ Financial

Hazem Danny Al-Nakib

University College London

Date Written: October 26, 2021

Abstract

We present a scalable architecture for electronic payments via central bank digital currency and offer a solution to the perceived conflict between robust regulatory oversight and consumer affordances such as privacy and control. Our architecture combines existing work in payment systems and digital currency with a new approach to digital asset design for managing unforgeable, stateful, and oblivious assets without relying on either a central authority or a monolithic consensus system. Regulated financial institutions have a role in every transaction, and the consumer affordances are achieved through the use of non-custodial wallets that unlink the sender from the recipient in the transaction channel. This approach is fully compatible with the existing two-tiered banking system and can complement and extend the roles of existing money services businesses and asset custodians.

Keywords: digital payments, digital assets, digital currency, distributed ledger technology, unforgeable assets, stateful assets, oblivious assets, banking, money services businesses

Suggested Citation

Goodell, Geoffrey and Toliver, D. R. and Al-Nakib, Hazem Danny, A Scalable Architecture for Electronic Payments (October 26, 2021). Lecture Notes in Computer Science 13412, doi:10.1007/978-3-031-32415-4_38, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3951988 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3951988

Geoffrey Goodell (Contact Author)

University College London ( email )

Gower Street
London, WC1E 6BT
United Kingdom

D. R. Toliver

TODAQ Financial ( email )

Toronto, Ontario
Canada

Hazem Danny Al-Nakib

University College London ( email )

Gower Street
London, WC1E 6BT
United Kingdom

0 References

0 Citations

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
407
Abstract Views
1,348
Rank
156,222
PlumX Metrics