Zombie Lending: Theoretical, International, and Historical Perspectives

28 Pages Posted: 18 Nov 2021 Last revised: 28 Mar 2022

See all articles by Viral V. Acharya

Viral V. Acharya

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business; New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Matteo Crosignani

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Tim Eisert

Nova School of Business and Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Sascha Steffen

Frankfurt School of Finance & Management; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 30, 2021

Abstract

This paper surveys the theory on zombie lending incentives and the consequences of zombie lending for the real economy. It also offers a historical perspective by reviewing the growing empirical evidence on zombie lending along three dimensions: (i) the role of under-capitalized banks, (ii) effects on zombie firms, and (iii) spillovers and distortions for non-zombie firms. We then provide an overview of how zombie lending can be attenuated. Finally, we use a sample of U.S. publicly listed firms to compare various measures proposed in the literature to classify firms as ``zombies." We identify definitions of zombie firms that are adequate to investigate economic inefficiency in the form of real sector competitive distortions of zombie lending. We find that only definitions that are based on interest rate subsidies are able to detect these spillovers and thereby provide evidence in support of credit misallocation.

Keywords: zombie credit, credit misallocation, capital misallocation, bank capital, undercapitalized banks, interst rate subsidy, spillovers

JEL Classification: E44, G21

Suggested Citation

Acharya, Viral V. and Acharya, Viral V. and Crosignani, Matteo and Eisert, Tim and Steffen, Sascha, Zombie Lending: Theoretical, International, and Historical Perspectives (October 30, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3953479 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3953479

Viral V. Acharya

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business ( email )

44 West 4th Street
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New York, NY NY 10012
United States
2129980354 (Phone)
2129954256 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~vacharya

New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance ( email )

Stern School of Business
44 West 4th Street
New York, NY 10012-1126
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Matteo Crosignani (Contact Author)

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of New York ( email )

33 Liberty Street
New York, NY 10045
United States

Tim Eisert

Nova School of Business and Economics ( email )

Campus de Carcavelos
Rua da Holanda, 1
Carcavelos, 2775-405
Portugal

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Sascha Steffen

Frankfurt School of Finance & Management ( email )

Adickesallee
32-34
Frankfurt, 60322
Germany
16097326929 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.sascha-steffen.de

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

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