Estimating the Economic Value of Zoning Reform

50 Pages Posted: 1 Nov 2021 Last revised: 9 Dec 2024

See all articles by Santosh Anagol

Santosh Anagol

University of Pennsylvania - Wharton School of Business - Business Economics and Public Policy Department

Fernando V. Ferreira

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School

Jonah Rexer

Princeton University

Date Written: October 2021

Abstract

We develop a framework to estimate the economic value of a recent zoning reform in the city of São Paulo, which altered maximum permitted construction at the city-block level. Using a spatial regression discontinuity design, we show that developers respond to the reform with short-run increases in filings for multi-family construction permits in blocks with higher allowable densities. In the medium-run we observe increases in housing availability and reductions in house prices in neighborhoods that were allowed more densification. Welfare is then estimated with an equilibrium model of housing demand and supply that allows for endogeneous housing regulation. We finding that, in the long-run, the reform produces a 1.9% increase in housing stock and a 0.5% reduction in prices, with substantial heterogeneity across neighborhoods. Consumer welfare gains due to price reductions are small, but increase 4-fold once accounting for changes in built environment, with more gains accruing to college educated and higher income families. However, nominal house price losses faced by landlords and existing homeowners overshadow all consumer welfare gains.

Suggested Citation

Anagol, Santosh and Ferreira, Fernando V. and Rexer, Jonah, Estimating the Economic Value of Zoning Reform (October 2021). NBER Working Paper No. w29440, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3953966

Santosh Anagol (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania - Wharton School of Business - Business Economics and Public Policy Department ( email )

3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6372
United States

Fernando V. Ferreira

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School ( email )

3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States
215-898-7181 (Phone)
215-573-2220 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://real.wharton.upenn.edu/~fferreir/

Jonah Rexer

Princeton University ( email )

22 Chambers Street
Princeton, NJ 08544-0708
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
79
Abstract Views
971
Rank
666,529
PlumX Metrics