41 Pages Posted: 15 Apr 2003
Date Written: April 2003
Rational politicians are interested in judicial independence (JI) in order to make their promises credible. But if politicians' preferences deviate from the dicta of the judiciary, they also have incentives to renege on judicial independence. These two conflicting aspects are measured by two indicators: (i) de iure JI focusing on its legal foundations and (ii) a de facto JI focusing on countries' actual experience. Whether JI affects economic growth is tested for a cross section of 57 countries. While de iure JI does not have an impact on real GDP growth per capita, de facto JI positively influences it.
Keywords: Economic Growth, Rule of Law, Judicial Independence
JEL Classification: H11, K40, O40, P51
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Feld, Lars P. and Voigt, Stefan, Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross Country Evidence Using a New Set of Indicators (April 2003). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 906. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=395403