Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross Country Evidence Using a New Set of Indicators

41 Pages Posted: 15 Apr 2003  

Lars P. Feld

Walter Eucken Institute; University of Freiburg - College of Economics and Behavioral Sciences; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Stefan Voigt

University of Hamburg - Institute of Law & Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 2003

Abstract

Rational politicians are interested in judicial independence (JI) in order to make their promises credible. But if politicians' preferences deviate from the dicta of the judiciary, they also have incentives to renege on judicial independence. These two conflicting aspects are measured by two indicators: (i) de iure JI focusing on its legal foundations and (ii) a de facto JI focusing on countries' actual experience. Whether JI affects economic growth is tested for a cross section of 57 countries. While de iure JI does not have an impact on real GDP growth per capita, de facto JI positively influences it.

Keywords: Economic Growth, Rule of Law, Judicial Independence

JEL Classification: H11, K40, O40, P51

Suggested Citation

Feld, Lars P. and Voigt, Stefan, Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross Country Evidence Using a New Set of Indicators (April 2003). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 906. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=395403

Lars P. Feld (Contact Author)

Walter Eucken Institute ( email )

Goethestrasse 10
Freiburg im Breisgau, Baden-W├╝rttemberg D-79100
Germany

University of Freiburg - College of Economics and Behavioral Sciences ( email )

Freiburg, D-79085
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Stefan Voigt

University of Hamburg - Institute of Law & Economics ( email )

Johnsallee 35
Hamburg, 20148
Germany
+49-40-428385782 (Phone)
+49-40-428386794 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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