Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross Country Evidence Using a New Set of Indicators

Feld, Lars P.; Voigt, Stefan

doi:10.2139/ssrn.395403

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Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross Country Evidence Using a New Set of Indicators

41 Pages Posted: 15 Apr 2003

See all articles by Lars P. Feld

Lars P. Feld

Walter Eucken Institute; University of Freiburg - College of Economics and Behavioral Sciences; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Stefan Voigt

University of Hamburg - Institute of Law & Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

There are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 2003

Abstract

Rational politicians are interested in judicial independence (JI) in order to make their promises credible. But if politicians' preferences deviate from the dicta of the judiciary, they also have incentives to renege on judicial independence. These two conflicting aspects are measured by two indicators: (i) de iure JI focusing on its legal foundations and (ii) a de facto JI focusing on countries' actual experience. Whether JI affects economic growth is tested for a cross section of 57 countries. While de iure JI does not have an impact on real GDP growth per capita, de facto JI positively influences it.

Keywords: Economic Growth, Rule of Law, Judicial Independence

JEL Classification: H11, K40, O40, P51

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Feld, Lars P. and Voigt, Stefan, Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross Country Evidence Using a New Set of Indicators (April 2003). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=395403 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.395403