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Contestability, Complementary Inputs and Contracting: The Case of Harbour Towage

Melbourne Business School Working Paper No. 2003-10

27 Pages Posted: 26 Apr 2003  

Joshua S. Gans

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management; NBER

Stephen P. King

Monash University - Department of Economics; Productivity Commission

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 15, 2003

Abstract

It has been argued that competitive tendering can be used to overcome problems of natural monopoly and to make markets 'contestable.' The recent Productivity Commission report into harbour towage in Australia noted the potential benefits of competitive contracting. Using the example of harbour towage, we investigate these claims when competitive tendering involves one segment of a vertical production chain. We show that direct customer contracting will not result in a perfectly contestable outcome if there is a complimentary input provider with market power. In particular, contracting involves a socially sub-optimal service quality. We consider whether this situation improves when customers delegate the contracting process. In the case of harbour towage, the port authority is an obvious delegated agent for the shipping customers. But delegation only improves the outcome from the customers' perspective if the authority is able to receive side payments from the towage operators. Such side payments, a priori would appear to be against the interests of the customers. We show, however, that side-payments help the port authority to overcome the problems of market power, benefiting both the port authority and the customers. Further, these contracting outcomes are socially preferred to the unregulated outcome where port authorities and towage operators set prices and quality independently. This analysis sheds light and generally supports the Productivity Commissions recommendations.

JEL Classification: L14, L50

Suggested Citation

Gans, Joshua S. and King, Stephen P., Contestability, Complementary Inputs and Contracting: The Case of Harbour Towage (April 15, 2003). Melbourne Business School Working Paper No. 2003-10. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=395601 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.395601

Joshua S. Gans (Contact Author)

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management ( email )

Canada

HOME PAGE: http://www.joshuagans.com

NBER ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Stephen Peter King

Monash University - Department of Economics ( email )

Wellington Road
Victoria, Roodepoort 3145
Australia

Productivity Commission ( email )

Level 28
35 Collins St.
Melbourne, Victoria, Victoria 3000
Australia

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