On Local and Network Games

24 Pages Posted: 17 Apr 2003

See all articles by Thomas Quint

Thomas Quint

University of Nevada-Reno, Department of Mathematics

Martin Shubik

Yale University - School of Management; Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Date Written: April 2003


The knowledge constraints and transactions costs imposed by geographical distance, network connections and time conspire to justify local behavior as a good approximation for global rationality. We consider a class of games to illustrate this relationship and raise some questions as to what constitutes a satisfactory solution concept.

Keywords: Local Games, Network Games, Advertising

JEL Classification: C72, D43, D89, M39

Suggested Citation

Quint, Thomas and Shubik, Martin, On Local and Network Games (April 2003). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=396081

Thomas Quint

University of Nevada-Reno, Department of Mathematics ( email )

1664 North Virginia
Reno, NV 89557
United States
775-784-1366 (Phone)
775-784-6378 (Fax)

Martin Shubik (Contact Author)

Yale University - School of Management ( email )

Box 208200
New Haven, CT 06520-8200
United States

Yale University - Cowles Foundation ( email )

Box 208281
New Haven, CT 06520-8281
United States
203-432-3694 (Phone)
203-432-6167 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/au/d_shubik.htm

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