Satisfaction Not Guaranteed - Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy in Western Europe

39 Pages Posted: 6 May 2003

See all articles by Alexander F. Wagner

Alexander F. Wagner

University of Zurich - Department of Banking and Finance; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Swiss Finance Institute

Mathias Dufour

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS)

Friedrich Schneider

Johannes Kepler University Linz - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Date Written: April 2003

Abstract

What determines citizens' satisfaction with the "constitution in operation"? We make two contributions towards an answer to this important policy question. First, we place stronger emphasis than existing studies on quantitative interpretations of the importance of different factors. We use scenario analysis to show that a consensual system generally promotes satisfaction, but affects different types of citizens differently. Second, we focus on informal institutions and rules of the game in European societies. Corporatism and group membership as a measure of social capital are good for satisfaction, and people who live in countries with a high degree of income inequality tend to be less satisfied. The findings for trust and for the rule of law are ambiguous.

Keywords: Satisfaction with Democracy, Political Economy, Institutions

JEL Classification: D71, D72, D78, P16

Suggested Citation

Wagner, Alexander F. and Dufour, Mathias and Schneider, Friedrich G., Satisfaction Not Guaranteed - Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy in Western Europe (April 2003). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=396322

Alexander F. Wagner

University of Zurich - Department of Banking and Finance ( email )

Plattenstrasse 14
Z├╝rich, 8032
Switzerland
+41 44 634 3963 (Phone)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Swiss Finance Institute ( email )

Switzerland

HOME PAGE: http://www.alex-wagner.com

Mathias Dufour

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) ( email )

79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Friedrich G. Schneider (Contact Author)

Johannes Kepler University Linz - Department of Economics ( email )

Altenbergerstrasse 69
A-4040 Linz, 4040
Austria
+43 732 2468 8210 (Phone)
+43 732 2468 8208 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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