Disagreement Aversion

44 Pages Posted: 16 Nov 2021 Last revised: 21 Mar 2022

See all articles by Antoine Bommier

Antoine Bommier

ETH Zürich - CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich

Adrien Fabre

ETH Zürich

Arnaud Goussebaïle

ETH Zürich

Daniel Heyen

University of Kaiserslautern; ETH Zurich

Date Written: November 15, 2021

Abstract

Experts often disagree. A decision-maker may be averse to such expert disagreement. Existing models of aversion to expert disagreement rest on ambiguity-averse preferences adopting a unanimity principle: If all experts consider one choice better than another, so should the decision-maker. Such unanimity among experts, however, can be spurious, masking substantial disagreement on the underlying reasons. We introduce a novel notion of disagreement aversion to distinguish spurious from genuine unanimity and develop a model that can capture disagreement aversion in our sense. The central element of our model is the cautious aggregation of experts’
beliefs.

Keywords: Disagreement Aversion, Ambiguity Aversion, Belief Aggregation, Decision under Uncertainty, Precautionary Principle

JEL Classification: D81, D83, D71

Suggested Citation

Bommier, Antoine and Fabre, Adrien and Goussebaïle, Arnaud and Heyen, Daniel, Disagreement Aversion (November 15, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3964182 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3964182

Antoine Bommier

ETH Zürich - CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich ( email )

Zürichbergstrasse 18
Zurich, 8092
Switzerland

Adrien Fabre (Contact Author)

ETH Zürich ( email )

Zürichbergstrasse 18
8092 Zurich, CH-1015
Switzerland

Arnaud Goussebaïle

ETH Zürich ( email )

Zürichbergstrasse 18
Zürich, 8092
Switzerland

Daniel Heyen

University of Kaiserslautern

Gottlieb-Daimler-Str., Geb. 42
Kaiserslautern, 67663
Germany

ETH Zurich ( email )

Zürichbergstrasse 18
Zürich, 8092
Switzerland
8092 (Fax)

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