First in the Queue: The Role of Access Privileges in Private Equity Performance

17 Pages Posted: 18 Nov 2021

See all articles by Andrea Carnelli Dompé

Andrea Carnelli Dompé

Pantheon Ventures (UK) LLP

Daniel Ferreira

London School of Economics - Department of Finance; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Davide Ferri

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Pedro A. C. Saffi

University of Cambridge - Judge Business School

Bo Tang

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE)

Date Written: November 17, 2021

Abstract

Access privileges matter in private equity markets. Funds of funds and other financial intermediaries can create value not only by selecting, but also by being able to access, better investment opportunities. We find that access-constrained funds outperform their peers, and that limited partners with access privileges tend to re-commit to access-constrained managers. The findings suggest that access privileges play an important role in explaining value creation and limited partners’ performance persistence in private markets.

Keywords: Private Equity, Access Privileges, Value Creation, Performance Persistence

JEL Classification: G11, G23

Suggested Citation

Carnelli Dompé, Andrea and Ferreira, Daniel and Ferri, Davide and Saffi, Pedro A. C. and Tang, Bo, First in the Queue: The Role of Access Privileges in Private Equity Performance (November 17, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3965747 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3965747

Andrea Carnelli Dompé

Pantheon Ventures (UK) LLP ( email )

10 Finsbury Square, 4th Floor
London
United Kingdom

Daniel Ferreira

London School of Economics - Department of Finance ( email )

Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
(+44) 20 7955 7544 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://personal.lse.ac.uk/FERREIRD/

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Davide Ferri

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Pedro A. C. Saffi (Contact Author)

University of Cambridge - Judge Business School ( email )

Trumpington Street
Cambridge, CB2 1AG
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.pedrosaffi.com

Bo Tang

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) ( email )

Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

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