Trademarks and the Cost of Equity Capital

Posted: 18 Nov 2021

See all articles by Bin Yang

Bin Yang

Jinan University - Management School

Zhe An

Monash Business School

Xin Gao

Zhejiang University - School of Management

Donghui Li

Shenzhen University - College of Economics

Date Written: November 18, 2021

Abstract

Employing a sample of 5,858 U.S. public firms from 1993 to 2017, this study documents robust evidence that firms that hold more trademarks enjoy a lower cost of equity, even after we control for other determinants of the cost of equity and industry-by-year fixed effects. To address endogeneity issues, we employ three federal-level trademark laws affecting the extent of trademark protection—the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, Moseley v. V. Secret Catalogue, Inc., and the Trademark Dilution Revision Act—as quasi-natural experiments. Our analysis reveals that the impact of trademark registrations on the cost of equity is achieved through the information asymmetry channel, the investor recognition channel, and the disciplinary channel. These results suggest that trademarks play an important role in alleviating firms’ equity financing costs, thus clarifying the underlying mechanism through which firms benefit from holding trademarks.

Keywords: Trademarks; Cost of Equity; Intellectual Property

JEL Classification: G12, M41, O34

Suggested Citation

Yang, Bin and An, Zhe and Gao, Xin and Li, Donghui, Trademarks and the Cost of Equity Capital (November 18, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3965989

Bin Yang

Jinan University - Management School ( email )

No. 601, West Huangpu Road
Guangzhou, Guangdong 510632
China

Zhe An

Monash Business School

Wellington Road
Clayton, Victoria 3168
Australia

Xin Gao

Zhejiang University - School of Management ( email )

Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province 310058
China

Donghui Li (Contact Author)

Shenzhen University - College of Economics

5th Floor, Wenke Building
3688 Nanhai Road
Shenzhen, Guangdong 518060
China

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