Options to Strengthen the Control of Acquisitions by Digital Gatekeepers in EU Law

61 Pages Posted: 22 Nov 2021

See all articles by Jens-Uwe Franck

Jens-Uwe Franck

University of Mannheim - Department of Law

Giorgio Monti

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC)

Alexandre de Streel

University of Namur; Centre on Regulation in Europe (CERRE)

Date Written: October 11, 2021

Abstract

Acquisitions of nascent competitors by digital gatekeepers are often not covered by EU (or sometimes national) merger laws because they fall below the thresholds that trigger a duty to notify, hence there is a merger gap. After outlining the competition concerns and the legislative activities undertaken or planned by some Member States, we study how such mergers may be reviewed at EU level with a one-stop-shop approach. We show the weaknesses in the Commission’s suggested approach of stimulating more referrals under Article 22 of the EU Merger Regulation and suggest three legislative options to close the merger gap. The paper explores whether Article 114 TFEU may be an appropriate legal basis for such legislative options.

JEL Classification: K21

Suggested Citation

Franck, Jens-Uwe and Monti, Giorgio and de Streel, Alexandre, Options to Strengthen the Control of Acquisitions by Digital Gatekeepers in EU Law (October 11, 2021). TILEC Discussion Paper No. DP2021-16, 2021., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3966244 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3966244

Jens-Uwe Franck

University of Mannheim - Department of Law ( email )

Schloss Westflügel
Mannheim, 68131
Germany

Giorgio Monti (Contact Author)

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) ( email )

Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/staff/g-monti

Alexandre De Streel

University of Namur ( email )

8 rempart de la vierge
Namur, 5000
Belgium

Centre on Regulation in Europe (CERRE) ( email )

Av Louise 475/10
Brussels, 1050
Belgium

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