The Trade Effects of Information Provision About Forced and Child Labor

Abstract

Does information about the use of children and forced labor in the production of goods affect their imports? I investigate this question using the largest naming and shaming strategy ever implemented worldwide: inclusion on the U.S. government's list of goods produced with child or forced labor. This list differs from previously used measures in the literature as it considers a broad range of goods and aims to provide impartial information for firms and consumers rather than being an emotionally promoted boycott or a labelling campaign. The paper finds that such information provision decreased United States imports of goods believed to be made using child and forced labor. The results are mainly driven by goods closer to the point of consumption, where consumers might reasonably be expected to penalize products that rely on such labor, with no effect is found for intermediate goods. Thus, public information strategies can be effective in disincentivizing reliance on child and forced labor for certain goods, but not others.

Keywords: international trade, child labor, forced labor

JEL Classification: F13, F14, J81