Computational Economics, Vol. 12, No. 1, August 1998
20 Pages Posted: 28 May 1997 Last revised: 15 Feb 2011
Date Written: January 21, 1997
Although the mathematical foundations of common value auctions have been well understood since Milgrom & Weber (1982), equilibrium bidding strategies are computationally complex. Very few calculated examples can be found in the literature, and only for highly specialized cases. This paper introduces two sets of distributional assumptions that are flexible enough for theoretical and empirical applications and yet permit straightforward calculation of equilibrium bidding strategies.
JEL Classification: D44
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Gordy, Michael B., Computationally Convenient Distributional Assumptions for Common Value Auctions (January 21, 1997). Computational Economics, Vol. 12, No. 1, August 1998; FEDS Discussion Paper No. 97-5. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=39740 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.39740