Own-gender favoritism in high stakes decisions: Taste-based discrimination on the Price is Right

27 Pages Posted: 6 Dec 2021

See all articles by Pavel D. Atanasov

Pavel D. Atanasov

Pytho LLC

Jason Dana

Yale School of Management

Bouke Klein Teeselink

King's College London; Yale School of Management

Date Written: December 1, 2021

Abstract

Evidence of gender discrimination has been found in a variety of contexts, but identifying the mechanism of discrimination is notoriously difficult. Discriminatory behavior could reflect a preference for treating one group differently than another, or it could reflect beliefs about average group differences. We identify a preference for costly gender homophily in a field setting that allows for remarkably clean identification of tastes versus beliefs: the One Bid game on the American TV game show The Price Is Right. In the One Bid game, contestants bid sequentially in an attempt to come closest to the retail price of an item without exceeding it. The last bidder has a dominant "cutoff'' strategy of bidding $1 more than the bidder they believe is currently in the lead, regardless of the skills or characteristics of that person. Cutoff bids are profitable for the last bidder, but leave the targeted contestant almost no chance to win. Our analysis of 11,016 One Bid games shows that last bidders of both genders are significantly more likely to cut off perceived leaders when they are of the opposite gender. We find no evidence that contestants hold incorrect gender stereotypes about skill. Our findings suggest that people display own-gender favoritism that cannot be explained by recourse to any set of beliefs and that outweigh substantial monetary stakes for being impartial.

Keywords: gender discrimination, taste-based discrimination, game show, gender homophily, stereotypes

Suggested Citation

Atanasov, Pavel D. and Dana, Jason and Klein Teeselink, Bouke, Own-gender favoritism in high stakes decisions: Taste-based discrimination on the Price is Right (December 1, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3975738 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3975738

Pavel D. Atanasov

Pytho LLC ( email )

866 President Street
Brooklyn, NY 11215
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7173335045 (Phone)
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Jason Dana (Contact Author)

Yale School of Management ( email )

135 Prospect Street
P.O. Box 208200
New Haven, CT 06520-8200
United States

Bouke Klein Teeselink

King's College London ( email )

Strand Building
London
United Kingdom

Yale School of Management ( email )

165 Whitney Ave
New Haven, CT 06511

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