Taste-Based Gender Favoritism in High Stakes Decisions: Evidence from The Price Is Right

36 Pages Posted: 6 Dec 2021 Last revised: 24 Aug 2023

See all articles by Pavel D. Atanasov

Pavel D. Atanasov

Pytho LLC

Jason Dana

Yale School of Management

Bouke Klein Teeselink

King's College London; Yale School of Management

Date Written: August 24, 2023

Abstract

Gender discrimination has been observed in a variety of field settings. Identifying the underlying mechanism behind discrimination in such settings, however, is notoriously difficult. We demonstrate own-gender favoritism in a field setting that allows for clean identification of tastes versus beliefs: the One Bid game on the TV game show The Price Is Right. In the game, players bid sequentially to guess the closest to the value of a prize without exceeding it, leaving the last bidder with a dominant `cutoff' strategy of bidding $1 more than another player. Despite large stakes for gender-neutral play, last bidders are significantly more likely to cut off opposite-gender opponents. We show how features of the game allow us to disentangle preferences for own-gender favoritism from beliefs that cutting off opposite-gender opponents is more profitable, and that only the former could explain this behavior.

Keywords: Gender Favoritism, Taste-Based Discrimination, Game Show, Stereotypes

JEL Classification: D7, J3, J7

Suggested Citation

Atanasov, Pavel D. and Dana, Jason and Klein Teeselink, Bouke, Taste-Based Gender Favoritism in High Stakes Decisions: Evidence from The Price Is Right (August 24, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3975738 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3975738

Pavel D. Atanasov

Pytho LLC ( email )

866 President Street
Brooklyn, NY 11215
United States
7173335045 (Phone)
11215 (Fax)

Jason Dana (Contact Author)

Yale School of Management ( email )

135 Prospect Street
P.O. Box 208200
New Haven, CT 06520-8200
United States

Bouke Klein Teeselink

King's College London ( email )

Strand Building
London
United Kingdom

Yale School of Management ( email )

165 Whitney Ave
New Haven, CT 06511

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