Anatomy of Trading Costs for Retail Investors: Savings from Off-Exchange Execution

44 Pages Posted: 6 Dec 2021

See all articles by Thomas K. Brown

Thomas K. Brown

University of Texas at Austin - McCombs School of Business

Travis L. Johnson

The University of Texas at Austin

S.P. Kothari

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management

Eric C. So

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management

Date Written: June 07, 2024

Abstract

Using both public and proprietary order execution data, we show that retail trades executed by wholesalers outside typical exchanges receive significantly more favorable prices, on average, than comparable trades executed on exchanges. Contrary to the claim that brokers sacrifice execution quality for payment for order flow (PFOF), trades executed via Robinhood, a high PFOF broker, receive better-than-average prices. Additional analysis shows this advantageous pricing arises because retail orders exhibit lower levels of adverse selection, and yields no evidence market power drives up retail trading costs. Our estimates and conclusions differ from related research because we analyze a broader sample and weight observations by dollar volume rather than equally. Overall, the zero-commission PFOF model for executing retail trades has lowered total costs below 6bp –- far smaller than they were previously.

Suggested Citation

Brown, Thomas and Johnson, Travis L. and Kothari, S.P. and So, Eric C., Anatomy of Trading Costs for Retail Investors: Savings from Off-Exchange Execution (June 07, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3976300 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3976300

Thomas Brown

University of Texas at Austin - McCombs School of Business ( email )

Austin, TX 78712
United States

Travis L. Johnson

The University of Texas at Austin ( email )

2110 Speedway Stop B6600
Austin, TX Texas 78712
United States
6178995325 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://travislakejohnson.com

S.P. Kothari (Contact Author)

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )

E52-325
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-253-0994 (Phone)
617-253-0603 (Fax)

Eric C. So

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )

100 Main Street
E62-416
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States

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