Conditions for Efficient Entry and Clustering
45 Pages Posted: 6 Dec 2021 Last revised: 8 Dec 2021
Date Written: November 26, 2021
We outline the conditions for efficient entry order and clustering in a triopoly preemption game in which firms differ in their sunk costs of entry. The critical factor turns out to be how symmetric the potential entrants are. If the cost asymmetry between the firms is sufficiently large, entry is always in the efficient order. On the other hand, if firms are relatively symmetric, entry order can be inefficient in that the firm with the second-lowest entry cost enters first. Furthermore, if there is any difference in entry costs between the two most efficient firms, there is never clustering (which is when firms enter the market at the same time). Lastly, in contrast to the case with relatively symmetric firms, when the cost asymmetry between firms is large, the leader's entry time in the triopoly is always earlier than it is in a duopoly.
Keywords: timing games, asymmetric firms, clustering, inefficient entry
JEL Classification: C72, L13, O31, O33
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation