The Democratic Peace: An experimental test of a causal relation and of underlying mechanisms

41 Pages Posted: 11 Feb 2022

See all articles by Jordi Brandts

Jordi Brandts

Instituto de Analisis Economico (CSIC) Barcelona

Catherine C. Eckel

Texas A&M University

Enrique Fatas

Universidad Europea de Valenca; University of Pennsylvania - School of Arts & Sciences; Paris Institute for Advanced Study; University of Nottingham - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx)

Shaun Hargreaves Heap

King’s College London - Department of Political Economy

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 2021

Abstract

Democracies go to war with each other less frequently than dictatorships do with each other. This is
an established empirical regularity. However, it is not clear whether there is a causal link between
democracy and peace. We use laboratory experiments to study whether there is a causal impact. We study the bellicosity of democracies compared with two types of dictatorships, inclusive and
exclusive, where each society is composed of three members. We also analyze how bellicosity
depends on the presence of the possibility of deliberation between the members of a society. Neither the ‘voting’ nor ‘inclusion’ aspect of democracy nor ‘deliberation’ in isolation has a positive causal impact on peace. However, when all three are combined, there is evidence that their combination produces less bellicosity than some kinds of dictatorship. It is the addition of deliberation that makes the crucial distinguishing difference for democracy in our experiment.

Keywords: conflict, governance, democracy, dictatorship, inclusivity, deliberation

JEL Classification: C72, C91, C92, H11

Suggested Citation

Brandts, Jordi and Eckel, Catherine C. and Fatas, Enrique and Hargreaves Heap, Shaun, The Democratic Peace: An experimental test of a causal relation and of underlying mechanisms (October 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3978810 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3978810

Jordi Brandts

Instituto de Analisis Economico (CSIC) Barcelona ( email )

UAB Campus
E-08193 Bellaterra
Spain

Catherine C. Eckel

Texas A&M University ( email )

5201 University Blvd.
College Station, TX 77843-4228
United States

Enrique Fatas (Contact Author)

Universidad Europea de Valenca ( email )

Paseo de la Alamenda 7
Valencia, Valencia 46010
Spain

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/view/enriquefatas/home

University of Pennsylvania - School of Arts & Sciences ( email )

Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States

Paris Institute for Advanced Study ( email )

17 Quai dAnjou 75004
Paris, île Saint-Louis
France

University of Nottingham - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx) ( email )

University Park
Nottingham, NG7 2RD
United Kingdom

Shaun Hargreaves Heap

King’s College London - Department of Political Economy ( email )

London
United Kingdom

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