High-Yield Debt Covenants and Their Real Effects

69 Pages Posted: 6 Jan 2022 Last revised: 5 Jul 2023

See all articles by Falk Bräuning

Falk Bräuning

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of Boston

Victoria Ivashina

Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Ali K. Ozdagli

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas

Multiple version iconThere are 4 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 7, 2023

Abstract

High-yield debt, including leveraged loans, features incurrence financial covenants or "cov-lite" provisions. These covenants differ from traditional loans' maintenance covenants, as they preserve equity control rights but impose specific restrictions on the borrower after crossing the covenant threshold. Contrary to the prevailing belief that incurrence covenants offer limited protection for creditors, our research reveals a significant and sudden decline in investment upon triggering these covenants. This evidence highlights a novel propagation mechanism for economic shocks, wherein contractual restrictions play a crucial role in the highly-leveraged corporate sector, becoming binding well before default or bankruptcy occurs.

Keywords: High-yield debt; corporate debt; covenants; incurrence covenants; cov-lite; amplification mechanisms; contracts; contingent contracting

JEL Classification: G31, G33, G21, G32

Suggested Citation

Bräuning, Falk and Ivashina, Victoria and Ozdagli, Ali K., High-Yield Debt Covenants and Their Real Effects (June 7, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3979835 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3979835

Falk Bräuning (Contact Author)

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of Boston ( email )

600 Atlantic Avenue
Boston, MA 02210
United States

Victoria Ivashina

Harvard University ( email )

Harvard Business School
Baker Library 233
Boston, MA 02163
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Ali K. Ozdagli

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas ( email )

2200 North Pearl Street
PO Box 655906
Dallas, TX 75265-5906
United States

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