Internet Appendix for 'Does Sensationalism Affect Executive Compensation? Evidence from Pay Ratio Disclosure Reform'

18 Pages Posted: 22 Aug 2022

See all articles by Wonjae Chang

Wonjae Chang

City University of Hong Kong

Michael Dambra

University at Buffalo (SUNY) - School of Management

Bryce Schonberger

University of Colorado at Boulder - Leeds School of Business

Inho Suk

State University of New York (SUNY) at Buffalo - School of Management; Korea University Business School (KUBS)

Date Written: July 11, 2022

Abstract

The Internet Appendix provides examples of the CEO pay ratio disclosure and media coverage surrounding the CEO pay ratio disclosure, the description of entropy balancing program, the procedure for decomposing the pay ratio into predicted and unexpected components, summary statistics for generalized difference-in-differences models of media coverage and shareholder reactions surrounding the initial CEO pay ratio disclosure, summary statistics for cross-sectional regression models of media coverage and shareholder reactions surrounding the initial CEO pay ratio disclosure, summary statistics for variables used in alternative difference-in-differences tests, additional results for alternative difference-in-differences tests, and the timeline for pre- and post-disclosure windows for alternative difference-in-differences tests.


The paper "Does Sensationalism Affect Executive Compensation? Evidence from Pay Ratio Disclosure Reform" may be found at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3470215

Keywords: CEO compensation; pay ratio; disclosure; pay-for-performance; media coverage; retail trading; say-on-pay; sensationalism

JEL Classification: G34, G38, M12, M52

Suggested Citation

Chang, Wonjae and Dambra, Michael and Schonberger, Bryce and Suk, Inho, Internet Appendix for 'Does Sensationalism Affect Executive Compensation? Evidence from Pay Ratio Disclosure Reform' (July 11, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3979898 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3979898

Wonjae Chang

City University of Hong Kong ( email )

12/F Lau Ming Wai Academic Building
83 Tat Chee Avenue
Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong
Hong Kong

Michael Dambra (Contact Author)

University at Buffalo (SUNY) - School of Management ( email )

255 Jacobs Management Center
Buffalo, NY 14260
United States

Bryce Schonberger

University of Colorado at Boulder - Leeds School of Business ( email )

Boulder, CO 80309-0419
United States

Inho Suk

State University of New York (SUNY) at Buffalo - School of Management ( email )

342 Jacobs Management Center
Buffalo, NY 14260-4000
United States
716-645-3215 (Phone)

Korea University Business School (KUBS) ( email )

Anam-Dong, Seongbuk-Gu
Seoul 136-701, 136701
Korea

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