Zombies at Large? Corporate Debt Overhang and the Macroeconomy

55 Pages Posted: 8 Dec 2021

See all articles by Oscar Jorda

Oscar Jorda

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco; University of California, Davis - Department of Economics

Martin Kornejew

University of Bonn

Moritz Schularick

University of Bonn - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Alan M. Taylor

Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: October 15, 2021

Abstract

What are the macroeconomic consequences of business credit booms? Are they as dangerous as household credit booms? If not, why not? We answer these questions by collecting data on nonfinancial business liabilities (primarily bank loans and corporate bonds) for 17 advanced economies over the past 150 years. Unlike household credit, business credit booms are rarely followed by macroeconomic hangovers. Data on debt renegotiation costs—instrumented by a country’s legal tradition—show that frictions to debt resolution make recessions deeper and longer—an important factor in explaining the differences with household credit booms.

Keywords: corporate debt, business cycles, local projections

JEL Classification: E44, G32, G33, N20

Suggested Citation

Jorda, Oscar and Kornejew, Martin and Schularick, Moritz and Taylor, Alan M., Zombies at Large? Corporate Debt Overhang and the Macroeconomy (October 15, 2021). Institute for New Economic Thinking Working Paper Series No. 168, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3980939

Oscar Jorda

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco ( email )

101 Market Street
San Francisco, CA 94105
United States
4159742691 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/economists/oscar-jorda/

University of California, Davis - Department of Economics ( email )

One Shields Drive
Davis, CA 95616-8578
United States
530-5549382 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://old.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/jorda/

Martin Kornejew

University of Bonn ( email )

Regina-Pacis-Weg 3
Postfach 2220
Bonn, D-53012
Germany

Moritz Schularick (Contact Author)

University of Bonn - Department of Economics ( email )

Bonn
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Alan M. Taylor

Columbia University ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

HOME PAGE: http://nber.org

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://cepr.org

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