Online Appendix to 'On the Permanent Nature of Affirmative Action Policies'

20 Pages Posted: 19 Feb 2022

See all articles by Philippe Jehiel

Philippe Jehiel

University College London - Department of Economics; Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées (ENPC) - Centre d'Enseignement et de Recherche en Analyse Socio-Economique (CERAS); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Matthew V. Leduc

Paris School of Economics (PSE) / Université Paris 1

Date Written: December 20, 2021

Abstract

In Section 1 of this online appendix, we briefly suggest how our model can also accommodate the case when affirmative action takes the form of a biased promotion process. In Section 2, we present a generalized model in which we allow for strategic behavior by workers (Section 2.1), for affirmative action causing a labor market congestion externality (Section 2.2) and we microfound the wage-setting behavior of firms with Bertrand competition (Section 2.3). Section 2.4 includes the proofs of these additional results.

Keywords: Affirmative Action, General Equilibrium, Loss Aversion, Prospect Theory, Moral Hazard, Game Theory

JEL Classification: D40, I28, I30, J15

Suggested Citation

Jehiel, Philippe and Leduc, Matthew V., Online Appendix to 'On the Permanent Nature of Affirmative Action Policies' (December 20, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3982544 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3982544

Philippe Jehiel

University College London - Department of Economics ( email )

Gower Street
London WC1E 6BT, WC1E 6BT
United Kingdom

Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées (ENPC) - Centre d'Enseignement et de Recherche en Analyse Socio-Economique (CERAS) ( email )

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75007 Paris
France
+33 1 4458 2873 (Phone)
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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Matthew V. Leduc (Contact Author)

Paris School of Economics (PSE) / Université Paris 1 ( email )

48 boulevard Jourdan
Paris, 75014
France

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/mattvleduc/

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