On The Quality Of Cryptocurrency Markets: Centralized Versus Decentralized Exchanges

Abstract

We analyze the market quality of centralized crypto exchanges (CEXs) and decentralized blockchain-based venues (DEXs) using a unique and comprehensive dataset. 

Focusing on two fundamental aspects, transaction costs and deviations from the no-arbitrage condition, we estimate the causal effect of  "gas fees'' on DEX market quality.

We show that these fixed costs impose a significant burden on relatively small trades and cause persistent arbitrage deviations.

Conversely, DEXs offer more competitive transaction costs for larger trades, offering a more favorable environment for institutional investors. 

Furthermore, we provide causal evidence that innovations aimed at enhancing the flexibility of liquidity provision in DEX markets lead to sizeable improvements in market quality.

Keywords: Decentralized Exchanges, Automated Market Making, Blockchain, Decentralized Finance, Market Quality, Limit Order Book, Uniswap

JEL Classification: G14