Information Systems, Service Delivery, and Corruption: Evidence From the Bangladesh Civil Service

100 Pages Posted: 20 Dec 2021 Last revised: 10 Nov 2023

See all articles by Martin Mattsson

Martin Mattsson

National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics

Date Written: August 10, 2024

Abstract

Slow public service delivery and corruption are common problems in low-and middleincome countries. Can better management information systems improve delivery speed? Does improving the delivery speed reduce corruption? In a large-scale experiment with the Bangladesh Civil Service, I send monthly scorecards measuring delays in service delivery to government officials and their supervisors. The scorecards increase on-time service delivery by 11% but do not reduce bribes. Instead, the scorecards increase bribes for high-performing bureaucrats. A model where bureaucrats' reputational concerns constrain bribes can explain the results. When positive performance feedback improves bureaucrats' reputations, the constraint is relaxed, and bribes increase.

Keywords: JEL Codes: D02, D73, H83, O10

JEL Classification: D02, D73, H83, O10

Suggested Citation

Mattsson, Martin, Information Systems, Service Delivery, and Corruption: Evidence From the Bangladesh Civil Service (August 10, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3986989 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3986989

Martin Mattsson (Contact Author)

National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics ( email )

21 Lower Kent Ridge Rd
Singapore, 119077
Malaysia

HOME PAGE: http://www.martin-mattsson.com

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