Information Systems, Service Delivery, and Corruption: Evidence From the Bangladesh Civil Service
100 Pages Posted: 20 Dec 2021 Last revised: 10 Nov 2023
Date Written: August 10, 2024
Abstract
Slow public service delivery and corruption are common problems in low-and middleincome countries. Can better management information systems improve delivery speed? Does improving the delivery speed reduce corruption? In a large-scale experiment with the Bangladesh Civil Service, I send monthly scorecards measuring delays in service delivery to government officials and their supervisors. The scorecards increase on-time service delivery by 11% but do not reduce bribes. Instead, the scorecards increase bribes for high-performing bureaucrats. A model where bureaucrats' reputational concerns constrain bribes can explain the results. When positive performance feedback improves bureaucrats' reputations, the constraint is relaxed, and bribes increase.
Keywords: JEL Codes: D02, D73, H83, O10
JEL Classification: D02, D73, H83, O10
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation