Noxious Government Markets: Evidence From the International Arms Trade

41 Pages Posted: 6 Feb 2022 Last revised: 30 Mar 2022

See all articles by Yahya Alshamy

Yahya Alshamy

George Mason University - Department of Economics

Christopher J. Coyne

George Mason University - Department of Economics; George Mason University - Mercatus Center

Nathan P. Goodman

New York University (NYU) - Department of Economics

Date Written: December 17, 2021

Abstract

Existing scholarship examines the moral status of markets, identifying some markets as “noxious”—markets deemed morally objectionable due to the background conditions preceding exchange and the resulting consequences. This literature primarily focuses on market exchanges between private parties. We broaden the analysis to include government markets—markets involving exchanges where either the buyer or seller, or both, are government officials. We develop a general theoretical framework to understand the conditions under which government markets are likely to be more or less noxious. We then apply the framework to the international arms trade to demonstrate its usefulness for understanding noxious government markets.

Keywords: arms sales, arms trade, commodification, equality, markets and morality, noxious markets, commodification

JEL Classification: F51, H44, Z19

Suggested Citation

Alshamy, Yahya and Coyne, Christopher J. and Goodman, Nathan, Noxious Government Markets: Evidence From the International Arms Trade (December 17, 2021). GMU Working Paper in Economics No. 22-08, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3988444 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3988444

Yahya Alshamy

George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )

4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States

Christopher J. Coyne (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )

4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.ccoyne.com/

George Mason University - Mercatus Center ( email )

3434 Washington Blvd., 4th Floor
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

HOME PAGE: http://ppe.mercatus.org/scholars/christopher-coyne

Nathan Goodman

New York University (NYU) - Department of Economics ( email )

19 West 4th Street
New York, NY 10012
United States

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