Effect of Health Insurance in India: A Randomized Controlled Trial

52 Pages Posted: 27 Dec 2021

See all articles by Anup Malani

Anup Malani

University of Chicago - Law School; University of Chicago Pritzker School of Medicine; Resources for the Future; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Phoebe Holtzman

Jones Lang LaSalle

Kosuke Imai

Princeton University - Center for Statistics and Machine Learning

Cynthia Kinnan

Northwestern University - Department of Economics

Morgen Miller

University of Chicago

Shailender Swaminathan

University of Alabama at Birmingham - School of Public Health

Alessandra Voena

University of Chicago

Bartosz Woda

University of Chicago - Law School

Gabriella Conti

University College London

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 17, 2021

Abstract

We report on a large randomized controlled trial of hospital insurance for above poverty-line Indian households. Households were assigned to free insurance, sale of insurance, sale plus cash transfer, or control. To estimate spillovers, the fraction of households offered insurance varied across villages. The opportunity to purchase insurance led to 59.91% uptake and access to free insurance to 78.71% uptake. Access increased insurance utilization. Positive spillover effects on utilization suggest learning from peers. Many beneficiaries were unable to use insurance, demonstrating hurdles to expanding access via insurance. Across a range of health measures, we estimate no significant impacts on health.

Suggested Citation

Malani, Anup and Holtzman, Phoebe and Imai, Kosuke and Kinnan, Cynthia and Miller, Morgen and Swaminathan, Shailender and Voena, Alessandra and Woda, Bartosz and Conti, Gabriella, Effect of Health Insurance in India: A Randomized Controlled Trial (December 17, 2021). University of Chicago, Becker Friedman Institute for Economics Working Paper No. 2021-146, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3990148 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3990148

Anup Malani (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Law School ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/malani/

University of Chicago Pritzker School of Medicine

Chicago, IL 60637
United States

Resources for the Future

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Phoebe Holtzman

Jones Lang LaSalle ( email )

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Kosuke Imai

Princeton University - Center for Statistics and Machine Learning ( email )

Princeton, NJ
United States

Cynthia Kinnan

Northwestern University - Department of Economics ( email )

2003 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States

Morgen Miller

University of Chicago ( email )

1101 East 58th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

Shailender Swaminathan

University of Alabama at Birmingham - School of Public Health ( email )

1665 University Blvd.
Birmingham, AL 35294
United States

Alessandra Voena

University of Chicago ( email )

1101 East 58th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

Bartosz Woda

University of Chicago - Law School ( email )

1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

Gabriella Conti

University College London ( email )

Gower Street
London, WC1E 6BT
United Kingdom

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