The EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime: Between Self Help and Global Governance

International Community Law Review (Advance Article published online, 20 Dec 2021)

26 Pages Posted: 22 Dec 2021

See all articles by Nathanael Tilahun

Nathanael Tilahun

Centre for Financial and Corporate Integrity (CFCI), Coventry University

Date Written: 2021

Abstract

By adopting a Global Human Rights Sanctions regime, the European Union took a new step in leveraging its power to respond to human rights violations globally. The regime has a general scope, and targets both state and non-state actors. This paper shows that this regime occupies a tension zone between two competing approaches to sanctions: a self-help approach that perceives sanctions as deriving authority from states’ sovereignty and subservient to their foreign policy, and a global governance approach that views sanctions as deriving authority from and bound by the objectives of specific international legal regimes they enforce. The tension between these approaches comes into stark view when constructing the listing criteria and policy objectives of the sanctions, which determine the scope of targets and duration of measures. Whether and how subsequent practice resolves this tension will be determined by certain legislative and interpretive moves by the EU Council and Court.

Keywords: Sanctions, European Union, Human Rights, Self-Interest, Global Governance, Obligations Erga Omnes

Suggested Citation

Tilahun, Nathanael, The EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime: Between Self Help and Global Governance (2021). International Community Law Review (Advance Article published online, 20 Dec 2021), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3990934

Nathanael Tilahun (Contact Author)

Centre for Financial and Corporate Integrity (CFCI), Coventry University ( email )

Priory Street
Coventry, CV1 5FB
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://https://pureportal.coventry.ac.uk/en/persons/nathanael-tilahun

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