The Fallacy of Complete Corporate Separateness

16 Pages Posted: 29 Dec 2021 Last revised: 5 Jan 2022

See all articles by Mariana Pargendler

Mariana Pargendler

Fundação Getulio Vargas Law School at São Paulo; New York University School of Law; European Corporate Governance Institute

Date Written: December 27, 2021

Abstract

Legal discourse about business entities has displayed a logical fallacy regarding the consequences of corporate separateness. A fallacy of equivocation occurs when a term is used with one meaning in the premise and with another meaning in the conclusion. Legal personality undoubtedly provides a separate – in the sense of distinct – nexus for the imputation of legal rights and duties. This, however, does not mean that corporations are or should be treated as legally separate – in the sense of insulated – from shareholders in all contexts. Moreover, legal insulation between corporations and shareholders for some purposes (e.g., limited liability) does not necessarily entail insulation for other purposes (e.g., the application of a contractual or regulatory scheme). In effect, there is significant, if varying, permeability between the legal spheres of corporations and shareholders across different areas of law, including corporate law. Rather than a nonconductor that always isolates the legal spheres of the corporation and related parties, legal personality operates as a semi-permeable membrane. Nevertheless, the recurrent fallacy of complete corporate separateness has obscured and hampered the development of legal doctrine in several contexts.

Keywords: corporate personhood, corporate separateness, fallacy of equivocation

JEL Classification: K10, K22

Suggested Citation

Pargendler, Mariana, The Fallacy of Complete Corporate Separateness (December 27, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3994854 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3994854

Mariana Pargendler (Contact Author)

Fundação Getulio Vargas Law School at São Paulo ( email )

R. Rocha, 233, Bela Vista
São Paulo, 01330-000
Brazil

New York University School of Law ( email )

40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

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