Freedom of Information and Corporate Pollution

53 Pages Posted: 28 Dec 2021 Last revised: 20 Feb 2025

See all articles by Adriana S. Cordis

Adriana S. Cordis

Winthrop University - College of Business Administration

Hunghua Pan

National Tsing Hua University - Department of Quantitative Finance; National Tsing Hua University

Jin Zhang

Monash University

Po-Hsuan Hsu

National Tsing Hua University - Department of Quantitative Finance; National University of Singapore (NUS) - Asian Bureau of Finance and Economic Research (ABFER)

Date Written: January 21, 2025

Abstract

We document a significant reduction in facility-level toxic emissions when state-level Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) laws are enacted and strengthened. Such laws reduce the costs of obtaining quasi-private information. Strengthened FOIA laws are associated with more FOIA requests to state-level environmental protection agencies, which are negatively related to local toxic emissions. Tests using paired facilities across state borders support a causal interpretation of our findings. Notably, the negative association between the strength of FOIA laws and pollution emissions is concentrated in states with higher preexisting pollution abatement costs, higher preexisting levels of public corruption, and more lenient environmental policies. Our empirical evidence suggests that reducing the costs of accessing information on governmental activities, especially those related to the regulation and monitoring of corporate emissions, mitigates polluting behavior. 

Keywords: freedom of information; open records; transparency; pollution; environmental awareness

JEL Classification: D80, H40, Q50,

Suggested Citation

Cordis, Adriana S. and Pan, Hunghua and Zhang, Jin and Hsu, Po-Hsuan, Freedom of Information and Corporate Pollution (January 21, 2025). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3995477 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3995477

Adriana S. Cordis

Winthrop University - College of Business Administration ( email )

Rock Hill, SC 29733-0001
United States

Hunghua Pan

National Tsing Hua University - Department of Quantitative Finance ( email )

101, Section 2, Kuang-Fu Road
Hsinchu, Taiwan 300
China
0933804873 (Phone)

National Tsing Hua University ( email )

Hsinchu
Taiwan
886933804873 (Phone)

Jin Zhang

Monash University ( email )

23 Innovation Walk
Wellington Road
Clayton, Victoria 3800
Australia

Po-Hsuan Hsu (Contact Author)

National Tsing Hua University - Department of Quantitative Finance ( email )

101, Section 2, Kuang-Fu Road
Hsinchu, Taiwan 300
China

National University of Singapore (NUS) - Asian Bureau of Finance and Economic Research (ABFER) ( email )

BIZ 2 Storey 4, 04-05
1 Business Link
Singapore, 117592
Singapore

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